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ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD 
CONSTITUTION, by John O McGinnis and 
Michael B Rappaport1
STACEY DANIS
ORIGINALISM—THE VIEW THAT THE CONSTITUTION should be interpreted 
according to its original meaning at the time it was enacted2—is an important, 
albeit highly controversial, principle of constitutional interpretation. In 
Originalism and the Good Constitution, John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport 
present a new normative defence of constitutional originalism that connects 
this interpretive method directly to the concept of a good constitution. Their 
innovative—and at times provocative—defence confronts the fundamental 
challenges that continue to plague originalism: does originalism perpetuate the 
dead hand of the past? How can the original meaning be justified, given that 
African Americans and women were excluded from the enactment of the Consti-
tution in 1787? How can originalism be reconciled with two hundred years 
worth of non-originalist precedent?
In chapters one and two, the authors set the groundwork for their normative 
defence of constitutional originalism. Their framework, premised on a welfare 
consequentialist approach to constitutional interpretation, is simple: the 
beneficence of the Constitution is connected to the supermajoritarian process 
from which it arose.3 Accordingly, an originalist interpretation is appropriate 
1. (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2013) 298 pages.
2. Ibid at 1.
3. Ibid at 3.
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because it captures the meaning that passed through the supermajoritarian 
process. As such, the results generated by originalism are likely to be beneficial.
In chapter three, the authors conclude that supermajority rule is superior 
to majority rule. Supermajority rule creates consensus, fosters non-partisan 
participation, and generates a veil of ignorance that helps promote and better 
protect minority rights.4 Chapter four illustrates the ways in which the US 
Constitution is consistent with supermajority rules. In particular, the authors 
highlight the symmetry between the process used to enact the original consti-
tution5 and the process used to enact subsequent constitutional amendments,6 
both of which are supermajoritarian in nature. Notably, the current amendment 
process allows each generation to import its own values into the Constitution. 
McGinnis and Rappaport use this feature of the amendment process to counter 
the oft-cited criticism that originalism permits the “dead hand of the past to 
control the present.”7
In chapter five, the authors contend that using the amendment process to 
update the Constitution is superior to relying on judicial updating. In chapter 
six, the authors explicitly address the three greatest failures of the supermajori-
tarian process: the exclusion of African Americans and women from the original 
process of constitutional enactment and the enfranchisement only of states, not 
citizens, to enact the Constitution and subsequent amendments.8 The authors 
canvass three plausible solutions. Owing to the fact that these failures have, in 
large part, since been rectified through constitutional amendments, the authors 
conclude that the most optimal solution is to follow the good, albeit imperfect, 
US Constitution.9
The first half of this book focuses on the authors’ normative defence of 
originalism. Chapters seven and eight fill in the positive content of originalism by 
showing that the enactors interpreted the Constitution according to the applicable 
4. Ibid at 33-61.
5. US Const art V. The requirements imposed under Article V amount to a double 
supermajority requirement.
6. US Const art VII.
7. Supra note 1 at 77.
8. Ibid at 100.
9. See US Const amend XIII, XIV, XV, XIX. The Thirteenth Amendment ended slavery, the 
Fourteenth Amendment prohibited state infringement of civil rights, and the Fifteenth 
Amendment forbade racial discrimination in the protection of voting rights. The Nineteenth 
Amendment guaranteed women the right to vote, ensuring that women from that time 
forward could fully participate in the constitutional amendment process.
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originalist interpretive rules of the time. Consequently, the actual meaning of the 
Constitution requires an application of these original interpretive methods.
In chapters nine and ten, McGinnis and Rappaport challenge the notion that 
originalism is inconsistent with precedent.10 They propose an optimal doctrine 
of constitutional precedent, which, generally speaking, dictates that precedent 
should be respected in two cases: when overruling it would result in enormous 
costs and when the precedent is entrenched and thus likely to be re-enacted via 
constitutional amendment.11
The authors conclude their defence of originalism by envisioning a world 
where originalism is the dominant view of constitutional jurisprudence. It is 
suggested that, only then, can we achieve “law that is enduring and objective, 
law that is of high quality, and law that is subject to revision by the people of 
each generation.”12 Overall, McGinnis and Rappaport successfully temper some 
of originalism’s strongest discontents. They offer a comprehensive defence of 
originalism that reflects the complex intricacies underlying modern constitional 
interpretation. This book, applicable to both Americans and Canadians alike, 
stands as an important contribution to the literature on originalism and the 
growing debate over constitutional interpretation.
10. Supra note 1 at 156. Gary Lawson was among the first to argue that originalism is 
inconsistent with precedent. Lawson’s argument remains one of the most powerful and 
persuasive. See Gary Lawson, “The Constitutional Case Against Precedent” (1994) 17:1 
Harv JL & Pub Pol’y 23. See also Gary Lawson, “Mostly Unconstitutional: The Case Against 
Precedent Revisited” 5:1 Ave Maria L Rev 1.
11. Supra note 1 at 179-85.
12. Ibid at 197.
